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When considering the relevance of contemporary learning theories to health education and 
promotion work in schools it is necessary to inspect the kinds of discourses used therein for 
how they understand and thereby constitute people and their worlds.  For instance, 
contemporary educational practices, teaching and learning included, are dominated by 
constructivist theory and its person-in-the-world purview.  It follows that from these 
discourses potentials for inclusion (and exclusion) emanate helping to constitute the very 
form and nature of our schools.  This paper contributes to an ongoing explication of existing 
and persisting discursive conditions in the cultural politics of education focussing on how 
these inform teaching and learning in health-education.  By critically examining the purposes 
of contemporary educational practice and the theoretical precepts which support its activities 
we move closer to being able to realise the possibilities of a refocused kind of work.  Such 
practice is dedicated to engaging meaning as it is applied by those in the living of their daily 
lives and accordingly decentres teaching and learning to enable health inclusive education. 
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Health education (and educational practice more generally) is theoretically informed by 
prevailing learning theories of the day.  In contemporary societies across the globe, such 
practice more often than not takes its direction from constructivist theories of learning 
(Bandura 2005; Davis and Sumara 2002; Donald, Lazarus and Lolwana 2006).  It could be 
argued much has been gained from theoretical advancements to constructivism.  Firstly, 
understanding has moved beyond behaviourism addressing criticisms that such theory ignores 
meaning making in human action.  Secondly, such knowledge advances beyond high 
cognitivism with its focus on the individual as a concealed information processing system 
analogous to the computer.  Briefly put, constructivism is a broad ranging theory of the 
person making meaning of the world (Kelly 1955).  It does not eschew its theoretical 
predecessors but rather integrates parts of each framework in a cognitive-behavioural model 
of individual action.   
 
Interestingly though, the practice of education is today recognised as an important social 
determinant of health (Galbally 2004; hereafter SDOH).  Navarro (2009, 15), speaking here 
about health education, partially pre-empts the theme of this commentary when he 
acknowledges:  
 
We have plenty of evidence that programmes aimed at changing 
individual behaviour have limited effectiveness.  And understandably 
so.  Instead, we need to broaden health strategies to include political, 
economic, social and cultural interventions that touch on the social (as 
distinct from the individual) determinants of health.  (emphasis in 
original)  
 
Whilst this is a critically important admission, herein I argue that recognition of education as 
one social determinant of health (along with employment, poverty, etc.) is but an initial step 
in a broader challenge.  Acknowledgement of SDOH cannot fully enable the degree of 
political, economic, social and cultural change health promoters and educationalists seek 
because of an enduring implicit theoretical paradox supporting such work.  To elaborate, in 
the first part of this paper I pose the following question: If teaching is seen as one of the 
fundamentals to health promotion in schools, has our reliance on learning theories dedicated 
to psychological individualism been a contributing factor to the kinds of limitations Navarro 
points to?  I argue the affirmative.  Then, in the second part of the discussion, I turn to 
explore what learning theories need to do to better support health-education practices so as to 
justifiably realise education as a sustainable and equitable social intervention (Smith and Barr 
2008).  This is an important distinction to make.  At the heart of this discussion is not a 
comprehensive review of current health promotion theory.  Rather, it is an engagement in 
life-enacted learning (Corcoran 2005), a situated, responsive and dialogic activity, one 
explicitly committed to the practice of health inclusive education.  
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Politics & Education  
 
In referring to education here I am specifically concerned with mandatory State directed 
systems and institutions.  In lay terms these would be recognised as elementary and high 
schooling in the US (varying by state), primary and secondary schooling in Australia or Key 
Stages 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the UK.  Because many schools are controlled by political authority it 
is vital that we attend to relationships created between knowledge and power.  As Foucault’s 
critical observations gleaned, in the past 200 hundred years western societies have seen 
significant shifts in State authority developing ‘a new relation between politics as a practice 
and as knowledge’ (Foucault 2000, 407).  Paralleling changes in political power, the world 
has witnessed the formulation and formalisation of the human sciences (e.g. psychiatry, 
psychology and sociology).  The mutually sustaining relationship between knowledge/power 
sees the continued development of certain knowledges which aim to objectify humanity by 
producing explicit norms used in the governance of human activity (Rose 1999).  In the case 
of health education, these socio-political norms are actively embedded in what is taught in 
schools.  In this light, Lambeir and Ramaekers (2008) include socialisation and curriculum as 
two aspects in what they call the educationalisation of health.  In direct reference to 
curriculum design, they point to how ‘something is being educationalised in the sense that it 
is being transposed, or displaced to a formal educational setting.  Something is made part of 
the curriculum – which means that it is transfigured as an object of learning, as something one 
can (and should) learn about…’ (438).   
 
To suggest that a main purpose of education and schooling is to enculturate young people in 
the norms and practices of communities has been acknowledged since Antiquity.  
Nevertheless, concerns over political interventions by governments (and those involved in 
knowledge production) in education around health-related topics are present (Craig 2007; 
Furedi 2009).  These criticisms speak to the idea that something (to continue Lambeir and 
Ramaekers’ terminology) is being driven furtively into schools and it is something that could 
be counterproductive to the very people it is intended to help.  Ecclestone (2004) believes that 
a pervasively emergent approach to learning, based on a ‘diminished’ understanding of 
people, is shifting views in education.  She foresees that: 
 
…preoccupation with vulnerability and psychological damage makes 
three side effects more likely.  One is that more students and educators 
come to believe that people deemed to be marginalised or disaffected 
from education are unable to cope without support.  The second is to 
shift attention from inequality outside and inside the education system 
to a focus on people’s feelings about it.  The third is to lower 
aspirations for achievement if this involves struggle, risk or challenge. 
(118) 
 
Such criticism I find difficult to accept for three reasons.  First, it seemingly fails to 
comprehend the generative possibilities of contemporary education, in particular the potential 
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benefits that come from health promotion work in school communities.  This work, as many 
health and education professionals know, can deploy across a range of applications from 
school health promotion and prevention activities involving all community members (i.e. 
school staff, students and their families) to individual intervention.  As Ecclestone would 
have it, a ‘preoccupation’ with inclusive education short-changes the potential capacity of 
marginalised or disaffected populations.  This is an interesting point and one which reminds 
practitioners to never predetermine the capacities of those with whom we consult.  
Nonetheless, focussing solely on one point along this continuum (i.e. individual intervention) 
is unnecessarily myopic.  Secondly therefore, discourse of this sort fails to acknowledge the 
variety of ways in which education, particularly around aspects of supportive and 
collaborative health-education intervention, can contribute to SDOH.  How else could we 
separate our attending to lived inequalities (i.e. inequalities present either/both inside and/or 
outside school that promote marginalisation) from our experiences of such?  This simplistic 
account glosses over valuable contributions linking daily life to SDOH.  Thirdly, and 
ultimately, the line that I pursue in this paper contends that views like Ecclestone’s cannot be 
accepted because they are based on the same prevailing discourse of psychological 
individualism that I am concerned impedes the work of committed health educationalists.   
 
Psychology & Learning   
 
Constructivist theories have been heralded for how they position the person as an active 
participant in learning processes and for acknowledging the social situatedness of learning 
(Lave 1996).  Certainly this sounds encouraging if one is interested in seeing developments 
leading to learning being premised in relationally-oriented psychosocial action (Grenier 
2010).  However, close scrutiny of constructivist first principles highlight the fact that 
psychological individualism remains its raison d’être.  For example, contemporary learning 
theories (and associated institutional discourses) commonly refer to student or learner-centred 
approaches (see e.g. Biggs 1996 or Cornelius-White 2007).  Here, the person-in-the-world 
purview of constructivism is enacted when, as ‘students gain a deeper conceptual 
understanding, they learn facts and procedures in a much more useful and profound way that 
transfers to real-world settings’ (Sawyer 2003, 4).  There are two fundamental concerns to be 
raised regarding the way in which knowledge has been conceived under the terms of 
psychological individualism.  First, as knowledge is objectified it loses moral and ethical 
specificity – its personableness if you like - becoming indiscriminate and static and second, 
when knowledge is seen as such it is considered functionally transmittable and able to be 
located within the individual.  Let us consider these points further. 
 
The ‘deeper conceptual understanding’ referred to above speaks to the constructivist view of 
cognitive structures or mental representations people are said to possess and use when 
thinking (Neisser 1967).  Presumably, as one becomes more knowledgeable, one’s mental 
abilities expand in capacity (or depth).  For example, health educators can teach students 
about the established benefits of certain food groups to assist in informing the choices made 
at the tuck-shop (Shepherd et al. 2006).  This ability is subsequently said to be transferred 
from thought to action when performing a particular task e.g. like choosing a meat pie or a 
salad sandwich.  Thus, in the space between what is considered to be public fact and private 
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cognition, objective or scripted knowledge can seemingly be transmitted, stored and deployed 
if and when it is required.  To some this may seem like an overly mentalistic account of 
constructivism but such admission does not negate the fact that this is how, particularly in 
educational contexts, the theory is operationalised.  In contrast, Davis and Sumara (2003) 
vigorously claim that constructivism has been misunderstood and they provide a notable (if 
not fateful) example to demonstrate their point.  When undertaking collaborative research 
with elementary and middle school teachers they realised that their own understanding of 
constructivism, focussed on process-oriented aspects of learning (i.e. acts of ongoing 
construal rather than building cognitive scaffolds), was often missed by teachers whose focus 
instead was on the transference of knowledge via teaching.  As such, the teachers co-opted 
constructivist discourse in support of representational accounts of cognition.  These kinds of 
accounts, similar to the description provided by Sawyer above, assume that knowledge of an 
external world beyond the embodied individual can be without too much effort represented in 
the individual’s thought and/or memory.  The teachers were it would seem employing a 
‘banking’ model of education (Freire 1970) whereby the task properly engaged sees the 
teacher depositing externalised knowledge into student’s internalised cognitive space.  The 
commonly used term ‘memory bank’ services this kind of discourse.  Davis and Sumara 
(2003, 137) lamentably concluded: ‘The decisions of many to ignore broader structures and 
collective dynamics as they focus on isolated topics and individual learners seem to have 
contributed to a deeper entrenchment of the assumptions that disciplinary knowledges are 
amoral and schooling is a benign (if not beneficial) project’.      
 
In the Introduction I made the point that this discussion was not necessarily a review of 
contemporary health education and promotion theory.  That said, it may be relevant here to 
briefly acknowledge developments in the area to consider whether the kinds of psychological 
discourse they employ offer authentic alternatives to models fixed to ideological 
individualism.  For instance, recent work in the field points to the theorisation of social 
context in understanding health behaviour (Burke et al 2009).  Also, the literature 
acknowledges the use of ecological perspectives in health promotion programming (Potvin et 
al 2008).  But yet, as I have been arguing in relation to learning theory, the prevailing model 
of personhood in health promotion work continues to rely on person-in-the-world 
constructivism: ‘The trajectory of theory, then, can be viewed as moving from a paradigm 
that places emphasis on the individual as the primary agent of change to a paradigm that 
conceptualises the individual as enmeshed in a complex system of influences that ultimately 
shape behaviour’ (Di Clemente et al 2002, 7).  The disciplinary knowledges Davis and 
Sumara refer to above are infused with power more often than not producing normative 
outcomes.  Put simply, the knowledges people live by (e.g. employing psychological 
individualism as the dominant discourse regarding human being), maintain a certain 
sociopolitical status quo and cannot be accepted as either amoral or benign.  Such recognition 
lies at the heart of inclusive education and will be discussed in detail below.  As a final point 
here, Welle, Russell and Kittleson (2010) outline five philosophies said to underpin health 
education and these include cognitive-based, decision-making, behaviour change, 
freeing/functioning and social change approaches.  If there were any question regarding the 
prominence of constructivist theory in health education one only need recognise the 
dominance of cognitive-based (i.e. information dissemination) and decision-making (i.e. 
teaching thinking skills) approaches manifest in current school-based health education 
practice. 
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Taking these considerations into account I return to the declaration made at the beginning of 
this article.  Whilst Navarro’s statement reasonably calls for communities to attend to SDOH 
it does so without addressing discourses of learning informed by psychological individualism.  
If we are to scrutinise underachievements in health education practice this is one crucial area 
where our attention should be focussed.  These are, as I have outlined, learning practices 
more often than not intended to start and finish with reductionist and disjoined views of 
human being.  Acknowledging this goes to further explicate the theoretical paradox which 
began this paper.  What I have been suggesting is that much of what accounts as health 
education is informed by curriculum, pedagogy and assessment aimed at individual behaviour 
change, attempts to effect such change via building cognitive capacity and does so within 
normative frameworks wherein issues of power and morality are more often than not left 
undisturbed.  
 
Scrutinising health education 
 
Health education’s normative agenda continues to attract scrutiny.  Ecclestone (2004, 122) 
warns of the dangerous rise of ‘therapeutic education’, which includes aspects of health 
education (e.g. Social Emotional Aspects of Learning [SEAL] in the UK), as being ‘a retreat 
from positive individualism to interest in people’s emotional and psychological weaknesses’.  
As suggested above, this view of education remains circumscribed for several reasons, one of 
which being that it fails to engage the scope and range of activities involved when health and 
education practice collaborate in schools.  Such debate is also inextricably informed by how 
we see or understand knowledge.  The discussion in this instance is founded on an age-old 
distinction made today mainly by psychologists which engages human being as principally 
couched in terms of cognition and/or affect.  It may come as surprising that Ecclestone and 
Hayes (2009, 153) are comfortable with suggesting that it is ‘obvious that emotions are 
involved in teaching but primarily with the intention and not with the content of what is 
transmitted’.  However, what this unsurprisingly means - as this position stands behind 
current dominant discourse in learning theory - is that knowledge should remain inherently 
objective (i.e. content-driven and cognitively apprehensible) thus able to be known apart from 
any emotional (read affective) perplexity.  It is a short step from extricating emotionality from 
teaching to also seeing education, as Davis and Sumara warned above, as morally neutral 
activity (see also Campbell 2008). 
 
Another resonant point stemming from Ecclestone and Hayes’ position is that knowledge 
exists as static and value-free content to be ‘transmitted’.  Once again from the banking 
premise (Freire 1970), knowledge existing in thought is suggested to move or be transmitted 
from one person (e.g. teacher) to the next (e.g. student).  To contest this view would seem to 
some, nonsensical.  If human thought does not exist within a person, where then does it exist?  
Of course, questions like these prove difficult to answer in the limited space available here.  
Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present discussion a rejoining question could ask: Is it 
important to physically locate thought (cf. Susswein and Racine 2009)?  Consider the 
possible potentials if dominant views were to be reconsidered in this way.  For starters, 
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knowledge need not be deterministically aligned with either cognition or affect and in doing 
so would no longer automatically service discourses of contained individualism.  By 
reconsidering ideas concerning the locatable existence of knowledge we could move to 
understanding knowledge as praxis, in the form originally suggested by the ancient Greeks 
whereby knowledge is applied amenably in practical activity (Aristotle 1992; Tountas 2009).   
 
A response to the challenge Navarro sets cannot simply be to refocus attention from 
individual to structural interventions.  Whilst there is obvious benefit to including within 
curriculum what is known as SDOH (i.e. knowledge concerning how issues like education, 
poverty or economics affect life potentials), broader scope for change calls for development 
in learning theories and teaching practices.  First, these would need to incorporate 
conceptualisations of both individual and collective action and yet also be able to move 
beyond the dichotomy.  This does not mean that we need remove the person from learning or 
social action.  With so many cultures in our world tied to ideological individualism it would 
be difficult to envisage how such an option could be possible.  No, instead, in focussing on 
practical activity (‘how to go on’ in Wittgenstein’s [2001] terms) and the knowledges that 
inform its accomplishment, examination turns to understand responsivity within praxis.  Here 
we can talk of a psychology premised on an ontology of activities rather than one defined by 
inferred possessed substances (e.g. cognition; cf. Harré 1995 or Shotter 1993).  A brief 
example should help to illustrate the point. 
 
Whilst practicing as a psychologist, at first in prison and then in schools, I was perplexed by 
how governments understood it that retributive punishment can and should used as a primary 
means for changing behaviour.  One example of this was (and remains) the practice of school 
exclusion.  I was uncertain exactly what was to be gained from excluding a student who was 
already experiencing difficulties (academic and/or relational) at school (and often too at home 
or in their community).  When engaging the student, an ontology of substances would 
subsequently be invoked as professional practices and the psychological discourses 
surrounding students created a deficit-based understanding of the person (Corcoran 2003).  In 
effect, the student possessed an ‘anger management’ problem or his (more often than not) 
motivation to learn would be called into question.  Conversely, and to this day, I wonder how 
educational practice informed by an ontology of activities would play out?  A preliminary 
consideration I felt would be that practices of exclusion (and inclusion for that matter) would 
need to be explicitly considered for how they enact potentials for prospective action.  Not 
only should educators be attentive to the temporality of life-long learning, they should also 
heed the relevance of process orientations to education or what I have previously called life-
enacted learning (Corcoran 2005).  Such concern moves the current discussion to directly 
address the notion of health inclusive education. 
 
Health inclusive education 
 
Thus far I have employed a subtle distinction when referring to health-education.  I do so to 
draw attention to the relationship of what has been (the hyphenless) and what could be (the 
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hyphened) envisaged between health and education.  Past efforts in the field of health 
education have seen individuals come to this work primarily from their own separate 
disciplines i.e. as health professionals or educationalists.  In schools, more often than not it is 
a case of the latter as educators deliver health-related content via the curriculum.  There are 
instances of the former, as was the case over the 8 years I worked as a school-based 
psychologist.  In this work I was continually frustrated with the exclusivity of disciplinary 
bias.  For the life of me I could not understand why health-education was not second nature to 
the work of health promoting schools.  In this section I will extend my discussion concerning 
how we come to understand and apply health-education.  This is a kind of prospective work 
explicitly aimed at enabling equitable and sustainable ontological forms of discourse and one 
which creates a special mode of transdisciplinary enterprise. 
 
Jensen (1997) outlined what he saw as two paradigms within health education.  On one hand, 
there is a ‘moralistic’ paradigm described as pedagogically didactic and content driven, 
offering no opportunity for students to engage their own ideas about what health might mean 
within the gamut of their own lives.  The alternative, a form of ‘democratic’ heath education, 
was based on a holistic concept of health, geared to practical activity and welcoming active 
participation in learning.  However, absent from Jensen’s reconceptualisation was a view of 
the psychosocial able to promote the kind of learning anticipated and hoped for as 
‘democratic’.  To this point, more recently Stenner and Taylor (2008, 431) contend: 
 
A transdisciplinary psychosocial studies would deal with the space 
‘between’ and would be inclusive enough to move between the 
abstractions of different sciences, noting their necessary exclusions, 
whilst simultaneously taking into account the situated personal 
knowledge and experience of non-specialists and other forms of 
subjugated knowledge.  
 
In turning our focus to practical activity we require, as I have been calling for here, a form of 
health-education that is able to both incorporate and move beyond individualistic and 
disciplinarily-monologic frames of reference.  As Stenner and Taylor (2008, 423) propose: 
‘The challenge is to invent new ways of thinking the social and the psychological together 
rather than separately and hence to recognise the extent to which they are distinct aspects or 
expressions of a unified process’.  The kind of practical activity I refer to is nothing out of the 
ordinary…and yet it could be.  It is a kind of life-enacted learning that constitutes what 
Wittgenstein (2001) called our ‘forms of life’ and herein lies the ontological aspect of health 
inclusive education.  These are unified (though not uniform) processes which help to direct 
how it is that a member of society or community should act in any given situation.  In relation 
to health-education, these are knowledges which have the potential to guide us in more 
explicitly equitable and sustainable forms of life.  Of course, they also can potentially disjoin 
us from the world and our relationships as is the case with most dominant forms of 
psychological theory, constructivism included. 
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Heterotopic approaches to psychosocial action enthusiastically enable options or alternatives 
to understanding, providing accounts which are inclusive of possibility, engaged historically 
and activities which promote dialogic relationships (Corcoran 2006).  Let us consider three 
examples of this kind of work.  Almost a decade ago Crossley (2001) provided an incisive 
discussion of how mainstream psychology constitutes knowledges relating to behaviours 
understood as ‘healthy’ or ‘risky’.  The discipline does so, she argued, through interventions 
focussed on the delivery of information and training skills.  The concern Crossley highlighted 
is that this kind of approach, akin to the banking model of education, facilitates a one-size-
fits-all method and in doing so poorly engages questions of meaning, value and identity for 
those for whom health education and promotion is intended to serve.  As Crossley suggests, 
‘people’s ideas about health, illness and disease have their own rationality – a rationality 
which arises out of the circumstances in which they live their lives and out of interactions 
with others which create a sense of morality, values, or an orientation to “the good”’ (2001, 
170).                       
 
Similarly, in his insightful work regarding resilience, Ungar (2004, 139-140) notably 
observed: ‘We seek in our children, both boys and girls, a fanatical desire for them to be 
conventional without attention to their (and our own) discourses of resistance.  Efficacy in 
social relations that give voice to this resistance is closely linked to experience of 
competence, whether that competence is expressed prosocially or problematically’.  As health 
professionals, educationalists and many parents well know, regardless of age, people do not 
always make the kinds of choices deemed appropriate according to the benefits of established 
knowledge.  According to Ungar, young people, particularly those seen to engage in ‘high 
risk’ behaviours (in relation to health these might include smoking, drug and/or alcohol use, 
law breaking, and so on), may in fact be doing what they can given available resources to 
define themselves in ways they consider fit for purpose.  Might Crossley’s and Ungar’s 
perspectives offer vital insight into the relative underachievement of health education? 
 
Finally, continuing with the notion of ‘risk’, Zyngier (in press) appeals for educational 
practices that problematise meaningful student and teacher engagement when each 
participates in learning.  Paralleling the call I made in the previous section for responsivity 
within praxis, this form of activity he terms ‘pedagogical reciprocity’.  Zyngier explains: 
 
The struggle over the definition of risk is significant in itself for it 
reveals the on-going ideological and epistemological divisions among 
educators and policy makers, as well as the general public.  Research 
on student risk has shown that an exploration of the questions of class, 
power, history and particularly students’ lived experiences and social 
reality reveal a complexity of factors that lead marginalised youth to 
leave school prematurely.  It is therefore crucial that questions of 
power, equity, and engagement with difference be addressed if we are 
to improve (learning) outcomes, not just for the most marginalised 
youth, but for all (my emphasis).  
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It should be stressed that health inclusive education would purposively avoid targeting and 
segregating certain sub-populations and individuals on the basis of perceived needs or risks 
adjudged against psychological or social normativities.  Often, these reductionist accounts act 
to disable young people as public knowledge of their capacities become subsumed within 
diagnostic categories like Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (Graham 2008), autism 
(Billington 2000) or depression (Nylund & Ceske 1997).  However, a dilemma then presents 
when discourses of disablement and psychopathology are intrinsically tied to teaching and 
learning resources.  Whilst acknowledging difference, the pragmatic and ethical imperative 
(and challenge) is to work with and against the available discourse without losing sight of 
what is meaningful to all involved (cf. Hayes 2003).   
 
Following Slee (2008), I see inclusive education writ large, fundamental to the cultural 
politics of education and the ongoing reconstitution of the nature of schooling.  However 
policy and practice in the area are defined, these should indubitably share a common purpose 
– to strive for equitable social change by enabling prospective action across all forms of 
human being.  And so, extending Stenner and Taylor’s position I envisage health-education, 
as a means to health inclusive education, promoting: 
  
a) differing disciplinary standpoints or knowledges yet looking for opportunities to 
occupy spaces between wherein unique forms may be known;  
b) the situatedness of knowledge yet accepting applicability across contexts;  
c) respect for heterogeneity and homogeneity in the commotion of what it means to be 
human (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, etc.); 
d) practical and active participation whereby one is always acknowledged as being in 
relationship with another; and  
e) peoples’ ongoing ability to resist, affirm and/or reconstitute being.    
 
In relation to teaching practice compelling similarly focussed developments have occurred 
looking to elaborate a ‘third space’ in teaching and learning.   Third space, according to 
Gutiérrez (2008, 152), ‘is a transformative space where the potential for an expanded form of 
learning and the development of new knowledge are heightened’.  Borrowing ideas from 
cultural (Bhabha 1994) and literary (Bakhtin 1986) theory, third space is created when joint 
action (Shotter 1995) sponsors hybridisations of meaning.  As Bhabha (Rutherford 1990, 211) 
observes: ‘The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new 
and unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation’.  When teacher 
and student meet in third space, ‘a deterritorialisation of one’s consciousness from the inside 
of one’s self to the outside, or into a Thirdspace between self and the Other’ (Kostogriz 2006, 
186) occurs.  Such ‘deterritorialisation’ is what I have been arguing is required for learning 
theory to enable an ontology of activities.  It is to an explicit recognition of relational joint 
action which I now turn for discourse on its theorisation further envisages the potentials of 
health inclusive education.   
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Health-Education’s contribution to thirdness     
 
According to Shotter (1995), life is a constantly engaged form of responsive activity or joint 
action.  Most importantly for considerations around psychosocial theory and its use in health-
education, such activity not only involves you and I (as in the commonplace constructivist 
self-centred dyad), it also entails a third participant.  This is an important consideration which 
has been given insufficient attention in learning focussed discussions to date (cf. Cheyne and 
Tarulli 1999 and Eun, Knotek and Heining-Boynton 2008 for exceptions).  Shotter elaborates: 
‘although invisible, the real presences generated in our active relations with our surroundings 
have agency, and, like another person, can exert that kind of personal force upon us’ (Shotter 
2003, 5).  Supporting this view, previously I have discussed the theoretical differentiation of 
first and second nature accounts of human being (Corcoran 2009).  How these contribute to 
understanding joint action in health-education and its relevance for what is discussed as 
thirdness is set out below.   
 
First nature accounts are those generated via dominant knowledging practice that historically 
have provided concretised and static forms of being.  This is the kind of substance oriented 
view of ontology I mentioned above.  Within this kind of knowledging practice we find the 
means by which professionals (e.g. educational psychologists and teachers often as 
representatives of State authority) adjudicate students’ abilities in relation to their 
performance inside normative frameworks.  Whilst there are arguably valid reasons 
supporting such practice these often lead to less than equitable, pathologising and 
disenfranchising outcomes for young people (Wyn 2009).  To move toward understanding 
and incorporating the relevance of joint action and thirdness to health-education those 
involved in the field must begin to explore second nature accounts of human being.  
Knowledge in this sense is always provisional as it endeavours to recognise how issues of 
meaning and power act upon us to constrain perspectives about who we are and what we are 
able to do.  Because knowledge is provisional does not mean its reach need be limited.  The 
social, political and cultural adaptability of knowledge is a pragmatic concern often left 
implicit in relationships.  Also and more importantly, such provisional knowledge can help to 
enable us to promote what is valued and meaningful to our sense of personal, relational and 
collective wellbeing.  Again, this is a matter of pragmatics.  What I am highlighting here is a 
direct and immediate challenge to practices in education, learning theory and curricular 
design and involves the need to acknowledge the capacity each has to contribute to thirdness 
or the ‘real presences’, as they are and are yet to be known.  To achieve this, as I have argued, 
we require theory able to accommodate both first and second nature accounts of human being.          
 
Acknowledging thirdness is of critical importance for changing future learning practices 
because, unlike objectively driven, individualistically-centred, person-in-the-world 
explanations which more often than not leave issues of ontological constitution implicit, 
within second nature accounts, it is explicitly recognised that knowledges are constituted in 
processes of relational responsivity and that these are primarily validated within discussions 
of what values mean for being human.  Shotter (1995, 78) summarises this point saying:  
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    …the ‘grounds’ for our claims to knowledge ultimately are to be 
found in who we ‘are’, in our forms of life.  For it is in our 
socialisation into certain ways of being that we learn how to do such 
things as making claims, raising questions, conducting arguments, 
sensing disagreements, recognising agreements, and so on.  These 
ontological skills – these ways of being a certain kind of socially 
competent, first-person member of our society – are necessary for 
there to be any questions, or arguments, at all. 
 
Here we are invited to acknowledge, as Dewey (1990) did over 100 hundred years ago, an 
ontological imperative to education which actively helps to create our worlds and who we see 
ourselves to be in those worlds.  As already suggested, these are moral and ethical contexts 
within which we learn and experience success and failure, praise and admonition.  And yet, 
despite recognition for their negotiated nature, adjudications regarding healthy behaviour are 
more often than not dominated by those with the power to speak above others.  Teachers, 
health professionals, one’s role matters not.  Whilst these positions are socially charged with 
authority such acknowledgement does not, by proxy, equate to their decisions moral or ethical 
(qua natural) validation.  The dominance of certain discourse in such decisioning could mean 
that, for any number of reasons (economic, political, relational, organisational, etc.), members 
of our communities (e.g. children, young people, teachers or health professionals) have been 
negated the opportunity to voice preferred ways of being or, that in their attempts to be heard, 
a person’s vociferousness is adjudged ‘risky’ or ignorant of normative standards.   
 
This is not a naive call for disquieted voices to be raised for to do so only perpetuates the 
practice that the loudest voice holds sway.  Rather, this is a call to go beyond understandings 
of Vygotskian (1978) socialisation by proximity – learning in health-education simply cannot 
be accomplished by proxy!  This claim may be queried by activity theorists whose uptake of 
Vygotskian constructivism aligns more with the position of Davis and Sumara referred to 
above and less to the concretisation of knowledge and disjoined explanations of social action 
(cf. Daniels and Cole 2002).  Nevertheless, notions around pragmatism play a central part in 
second nature reconfigurations speaking directly to issues of equity and sustainability in 
contemporary communities.  To extend the point implied in the previous paragraph, social 
authority is more often than not understood to be natural because of the pragmatics involved.  
If health-education is to be truly democratic it must attend to and rebuke the implicit nature of 
knowledge/power.  In doing so, knowledge becomes the servant and not the master of the 
forms of life we envisage for ourselves and future generations.  This kind of knowledge is 
sustainable because it is constantly under review by those it serves.  But there is a 
responsibility here that cannot be avoided or denied.  It is a practical moral responsibility to 
those with whom we share our lives.  Because knowledge is shared in this way it distinctively 
sustains who we are, letting us know what is not permissible or beyond our present means yet 
still allows us to reach for our dreams, seek out our hopes and willingly pursue our desires.  
Admitting that health education has underachieved is not admitting failure, it is the first step 
to change.        
 




In this commentary I have acknowledged how societal norms are purposively embedded in 
educational practices.  As participants in democratic states, we should together argue and 
closely scrutinise our institutions and their related practices.  It is through this kind of 
participatory engagement that people come to imbue within these practices a sense of 
themselves and the values they want institutions to adhere to and promote.  Particularly in the 
field of education, debate can (and I argue should) invoke an unsettling of one’s sensibilities – 
an ontological crisis of sorts (Thomson 2005).  For educators and those educated, such 
experience shows commitment, investment and purchase in the presence of the activity and 
also suggests how and in what ways learning practices can be enabled for future change. 
Health inclusive education goes beyond the appearance of curricular containing objectified 
health related knowledge delivered by teachers to students. To participate in health inclusive 
education school staff, students, families and learning communities must actively and 
purposively engage not only what it means individually and collectively to be healthy but 
also, and probably more pragmatically important, how becoming healthy (i.e. change) within 
these forms of life can be sustained.               
 
I have intentionally avoided use of a term common to discussions of this kind, that which 
discusses the ‘hidden curriculum’ (Apple 1971), for I believe we must progress dialogue past 
the deconstruction of societal practice to offering ways to reconstruct our daily activities.  
Whilst helpful to the cause, it is not enough to merely point to what is implicit without 
providing a means to engage an alternative.  Instead, the kind of relationally oriented 
psychological understanding Shotter provides connects with Deweyian ideas concerning the 
ontological purposes of education to offer us another option.  By following leads such as these 
we proactively position ourselves, moving toward more equitable and sustainable theories, 
discourses that responsively engage what being human means to the practical activity of 
learning in inclusive healthy communities. 
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